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Abstract 
This study evaluates the impact family ownership on the firm‟s performance for the period of 
2004 to 2009 considering a sample 29 manufacturing firms listed at KSE-100 index in the 
Pakistani capital market. The dependent variable is performance which is measured by ROA, 
ROE and Q of the sample firm and the independent variable is family ownership. Linear 
regression model is used for estimation along correlation analysis. The study reported positive 
relation between the ownership variable and performance variables. The results indicate negative 
association between the ownership variable and firm‟s dividend payment concluding that family 
control firms prefer to retain earning and investment opportunities rather to distribute the 
earnings. The empirical analysis reveal that the overall better governance practices have positive 
affect on financial decision. However, the firms with more family ownership do not adopt good 
practices and disclose less.  
 
Key words: Family ownership, Return on Asset, Return on Equity, Tobin‟s Q, agency theory, 
entrenchment theory. 
 
1. Introduction  
 In the emerged markets the subject of corporate governance is hot issue for the discussion. 
Because globalization of the market place has made the world market place accessible to the 
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cooperate governance of the countries. Which leads the intensified the competition in the 
domestic front with the advent of multinational firms. In this scenario quality of governance has 
become a critical success factor for survival and a source of competitive advantage. It has also 
become a major factor influencing the ability of company to raise funds from capital market.   
La Portal et al (2000) define the corporate governance as “corporate governance is to a certain 
extent of set of mechanism through which the outside investors protect themselves against the 
expropriation by the insiders”. 
The corporate governance structure is composed of a variety of elements, including the roles of 
management, ownership, and the board of directors or manager stock holders that managerial 
performance. Good corporate structure encourages companies to generate value in term of 
innovation, development, and exploration and provide accountability to control system 
corresponding with the risk involved. 
The code of corporate governance introduced by SECP early 2002 is the major step in the 
corporate governance reforms in Pakistan. The code includes many rules and regulations and 
recommendation in line with international practices. The major areas of enforcement include 
reforms of board of directors in order to make it accountable to all shareholders and better 
disclosure including improved internal and external audits for listed companies. However, the 
code‟s limited provisions on director‟s independence remain voluntary and provide no guidance 
on internal controls, risk management and board compensation policies. 
In Pakistani capital market culture 59 percent of the firms are family owned. The major‟s shares 
of these companies are blocked by the owners and the managers of these firms. Beside this these 
firm‟s have pyramid structure and cross holding ownership structure which leads to agency 
conflict and the outsiders especially in case of business groups face difficult to understand the 
ownership structure of these companies.  
This paper investigates the relationship between performance and family share ownership firms. 
Family firms are fundamental and feature of the Pakistan‟s corporate sector. These family firms 
are more or less valuable than non-family firms, it is an open discussion… The major question is 
that family management creates or destroys value. The agency theory presumed that the agency 
problem can be reduced or even eliminate by the family management and predict positive effect 
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on the firm‟s value. The firms in the selected sample have more than 25% share are treated as 
family managed firms.  
The family owned companies are typically managed by owners themselves. In case of state 
owned enterprises and multinationals there is often direct relationship between state/foreign 
owners and management again bypassing the boards. Many important corporate decisions are not 
made on boards‟ Annual General Meetings (AGMs) level. The code explicit mentions director‟s 
duties to act with objective and independent judgment and in the best interest of company. In 
business groups boards are dominated by executives and non-executives members of controlling 
family and by proxy directors appointed to act their behalf. Inter-locking directorships are often 
used to retain majority control. Family dominated boards are less able to protect minority 
shareholders right and risk a loss of competitiveness as other boards become more professional. 
1.2. Objective of the Study  
The main focus of this study is to examine the relationship between Family Ownership and 
firm‟s performance for publicly listed KSE firms. Therefore we attempt to indentify the 
relationship between ownership concentration and the firm‟s performance in our sample of KSE 
firms. In Pakistani capital market, traditionally low dispersion of ownership, the primary tool to 
solve agency problem are the legal protection of minority investors, the use of boards as 
monitors of senior management. In contrast to development markets in Pakistan corporate 
governance is characterized by lesser reliance on capital market and outside investors, but strong 
reliance on large insider investors and financial institutions to achieve efficiency in the corporate 
sector. The main objectives of this study are. 
The main focus of this study is to explore the how much firm performance affect by the family 
concentrated ownership. Secondly this paper adds the literature that what are the determinants of 
family ownership concentration in manufacturing firms listed at Karachi Stock Exchange (KSE). 
Finally it contributes the literature that management the family concentered firms effect the 
corporate financial decisions. 
1.3. Significance of the study  
This study helps the investors to understand the ownership pattern practices in the capital market 
of Pakistan. It also helps the manager to solve the agency conflict with the shareholder and have 
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to take sound decision about their corporate policies namely their dividend and debt decisions. 
This study assists the investors to take decisions about their ownership pattern and the market 
value of their stocks in the capital market (KSE). 
2. Literature Review 
This section includes the review of the precedent studies in the area of ownership structure and 
firms performance.  The association between ownership structure and firms performance has 
been the subject of important and ongoing debate in the corporate finance literature and on the 
pillar of these studies valuable facts, statistics and results has been accomplished. 
Klein, Shapiro and Young (2005) documented that due to difference in ownership concentration 
across countries the relationships in governance-performance also vary. Because difference in 
the general and economic environment (e.g.  Level of competition in product and capital 
markets) may produce different performance in different countries. In the same pattern Family 
firms may differ with many dimensions that impact performance such as the ownership structure, 
firm‟s culture, managerial philosophy and experience have great influence on the firm decision 
making process and performance. 
Villalonga and Amit (2004) presumed that the family concentrated firms create value only when 
it is associated with family management and control. . Family management adds value as long as 
the founder serves as the CEO of the family firm, or as it Chairman with a non-family CEO. 
When descendants of the founder serve as CEO, firm value destroyed. Family control in excess 
of ownership is often displayed in custom of multiple shares classes, pyramids, cross-holding, or 
voting agreements. These strategies reduced the shareholder values. 
The literature has provided mix result about the relationship between the family concentration 
and performance. Demsetz and Lehn(1985) provide the evidence that managerial cost reduced by 
the family concentrated firms.  While the same finds was contradict with the study of Fame and 
Jensen (1985). They argued that family ownership caused agency cost, which leads suboptimal 
investment decisions, high managerial compensation and employment of competent family 
managers. 
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Morck et al (2000) contribute to the academic literature that firms have undiversified share 
holding pattern (i.e. family concentered) forgo maximum profits, due to the difficulty of their 
financial preference with the outside holders. The family concentrated firms limit the executive 
management position to the family members. So these suffer to obtain talent and qualified 
capable employee from the labor pool.  
McConaughty et al. (1998) and Aaderson and Reeb (2003) suggest that family control firms 
should enhance the firms value. Due to their large wealth investment, interested in reducing the 
agency conflict and in managing firm resources in well manner to create firm value. Secondly in 
family concentrated firms, the owners have long-term relation with the firm and have long term 
prospective more conductive in taking value creating decisions.  Demsetz Lehn (1985) found that 
firm‟s value is closely related with high family owned firms, because the family appointed 
persons closely monitor managers and compact the free ride problem inherent with small.   
Maury (2006) finds out that in the Western European Countries family control increase firm 
profitability, whereas legal environment protect minority shareholders against family 
opportunism.  Ben-Amar & Andre (2005) find that a large proportion of Canadian public 
companies have controlling shareholders (families) that often exercise control over voting rights 
while holding a small fraction of cash flow rights. This separation of ownership from control 
rights is achieved through the concurrent use odd dual class voting shares and stock pyramids. 
While Canada is believed to offer good protection to minority shareholders, dominant 
shareholders are nevertheless able to obtain private benefit. The study concluded that in an 
environment with good legal and extra institutions protection minority shareholders where firms 
need to maintain good relationship with the investment community, the dominant shareholders 
can add value by the competencies and well played monitoring role. 
 
3. Methodological Framework and Data 
In the literature of economics and corporate finance, the relationship between ownership 
concentrations and firm‟s performance is hot debate. Large empirical research done using 
different methodologies has focused on the relationship between ownership concentration and 
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firm‟s performance and provides mixed evidence. The literature provide both empirically and 
theoretical the association between concentrated ownership and firms performance both positive, 
negative, mixed and statistically no relationship. This is due to the tradeoff between the agency 
frame work and entrenchment effect.  
The entrenchment theory can be defining “The possible outcome of the decisions of manager 
(family) firms. Managers of the firms can identify and investment in the positive NPV projects 
than the family managers of the firms. But the family managers prefer to invest in projects which 
benefit themselves and might not maximize the earning per share (EPS) of the firm. The 
entrenchment theory is define by the Weisbach (1988) “the problem of entrenchment occurs 
when the managers gain maximum authority (high power), start use the firms resources for their 
personal benefits rather in the interest of the shareholders. The entrenchment theory suggest the 
negative relationship between managerial ownership and the firm performance by arguing that 
managerial ownership above certain threshold will destroy the firm value due the conflict 
between large block holders.  
Jensen and Meckling (1976) conclude that agency cost and managerial ownership are negatively 
related and have positive relationship between managerial ownership and firm‟s performance. 
the convergence –of- interest hypothesis suggest a positive relationship between managerial 
ownership and firms performance , due to the large equity share of the managers should be 
associated with high market valuations due to lower agency cost. 
Higher family ownership in the firms motivates the family managers to perform well due to the 
incentive alignment. A manager owning the large frication of the shares in the firm bears the 
consequences of managerial action that either create or destroy the performance. As 
consequences with managers shareholders are likely to work hard and create better investment 
decisions and high managerial ownership firms should better performance. On the basis of 
agency theory explanation, this study presumed following hypothesis for the Pakistani capital 
market. 
H1: There is a positive relationship between managerial ownership and firm’s 
performance   
7 
 
3.1 Methodology 
In the literature of finance, the issue of managerial ownership and firms financial policies is 
debatable from last many years. Some of the researchers used the Logit approach to solve this 
issue. While Amitabh (1999) elaborate this problem by using the simultaneous regression frame 
work. 
Short and Keasey (1999) investigate the association between ownership structure and 
performance of firms Taking 225 UK firms listed on London Stock Exchange for the period of 
1988-92.  The variable of ownership has been taken as, shares held by the directors, held by 
institutions with more than 5% stocks, and external ownership in percentage was taken. 
Performance is measured through return on equity and Tobin‟s Q and the evidence suggests that 
there is positive significant effect of director ownership and cubic ownership but have significant 
negative effect of squared ownership the polynomials reach its maximum at 16% and its 
minimum at 42% ownership. 
Santor & King (2008) study how family ownership affects the performance and capital structure 
of 613 Canadian firm‟s period 1998-2005. They adopt the panel data regression approach and 
report different results from the US economy based results. This is due the difference of the legal 
environment and market conditions. They measure performance with ROA and Tobin‟s Q as 
dependent variable while independent variable is the percentage family ownership concentration. 
They used explanatory variables size, sales growth, industry dummy, firm age and documented 
positive relationship between both performance variables and family ownership.     
To test the above mentioned hypothesis performance measures are used: return on asset (ROA), 
return on equity (ROE) and Tobin Q. The performance measures are regressed on family 
ownership variables along set explanatory variables. This leads to the estimation of following 
equations 
itititititititit SIZENEGLEVDIVFOROA   6543210                                             
itititititititit SIZENEGLEVDIVFOROE   6543210                                         
itititititititit SIZENEGLEVDIVFOQ   6543210  
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Return on asset (ROA), return on equity (ROE) and Tobin‟s Q (Q) is dependent variable. FO is the 
percentage of family ownership is the independent variable while the control variables are dividend 
(DIV), leverage (LEV), sales growth (G), Net income (NE) and the size of the firm (SIZE) where έ is the 
error term. 
In this study, the estimation procedure for the analysis of hypothesis is regression frame work, 
pooled time series cross sectional analysis, ordinary least square method (OLS) and pooled 
sample regression model is used. 
3.2 Definition of variables 
Variables  Explanatory Variables 
Family Ownership FO %age family shareholding in the firm i at time t , i-e the shares held by the 
directors and spouses and other family personals.  
Dividend DIV Variable used to measure dividend paid to outside shareholders, so the 
interdependence between dividend and leverage strictly affect principal 
repented by the outside shareholders (Crutchy and Hansen, 1984) 
Leverage LEV Long term debt divided by total long term debt plus market value of the 
common stock outsiders 
Size SIZE Natural log (total assets). This variable is expected to have a positive coefficient 
as large more diversified firms are likely to have a lower a lower bankruptcy 
and can sustain a higher level of debt (Scott and Martin 1975, Ferri and Jones 
1979). 
Growth G Growth in this study has used as proxy to investment opportunity and obtain by 
book to equity value of the market. Book to market value of equity is mostly 
used by financial researchers. Net income used as explanatory variable and can 
be obtained by dividing net income over net sales. The same variable used by 
the Amitabh (1999) to find impact of insider holding on the financial policy of 
US banking Industry. 
Net Income NE Net income used as explanatory variable and can be obtained by dividing net 
income over net sales. The same variable used by the Amitabh (1999) to find 
impact of insider holding on the financial policy of US banking Industry 
Return on Asset ROA we take return on the assets as the ratio of return to total assets, where return is 
define as the difference between operating revenues and expenditures before tax 
and interest payment, and the total asset includes fixed asset, investment and 
current assets. ROA = Profit before Depreciation, interest and Tax (PBDIT)/ 
total assets.     
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Return on Equity ROE Return on equity capital as the ratio of return to equity capital. Equity capital is 
the total outstanding paid up equity capital of the firm as at the end of the 
accounting period. Return on equity can be calculated by the following 
approach. ROE = PBIT/ EQUITY 
Tobin‟s Q Q  Proxy for Tobin‟s Average Q is defining as the ratio of the value of the firm 
divided by the replacement value of the firm. Here we take the market value of 
common equity plus total borrowing and for the replacement cost. The Tobin‟s 
Q can be calculated by the following method. Q = (Total Borrowings + Market 
Value Equity)/ Total assets 
 
3.3 Data and Sample Selection 
 To assess the effect of family ownership on the firm‟s performance, in emerging economy, we 
focus attention on Pakistani corporate sector. The Data set includes KSE 100 index non-financial 
firms. KSE 100 consists of 100 firms of financial and non-financial companies. There are 67 
non-financial public limited companies listed KSE 100 index. Due the data inconsistent and 
major merger and acquisition in the financial sector, our samples not include the financial sector 
and focus our analysis on the manufacturing companies of the KSE 100 indexes. Initially we 
start with 67 listed form different sectors and time under consideration was 2004-2009. But due 
to unavailability of published reports of some firms we exclude those firms from our sample. At 
the end we got sample of 29 firms representing of KSE 100 index. As we got most of our 
variables from balance sheet analysis of listed firms published by the state bank of Pakistan. 
While the ownership variables are calculated from the annual reports of the selected companies. 
According to rules and regulation Security Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP) are 
bounded to publish ownership pattern in their annual reports. The first problem was the 
authenticity of the data, as the sampled firms are not using International financial standards 
(IFRS) 
 
4. Empirical Results  
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
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As our sample consists of 29 manufacturing firms listed at KSE-100 index. Table 4.1 explains 
the characteristics of the sample firm. 
Table 4.1 Sample Distribution by Industries 
Sectors No. of Companies Selected % 
Textile & Fabrics 8 27.5% 
Cement 2 6.8% 
Steal 2 6.8% 
Sugar 3 10.3% 
Other 14 48.2% 
Total 29 100% 
Source: Balance sheet Analysis of Joint Stock Companies 
The textile sector and the cement sector of the Pakistan are family concentrated firms. The textile 
and cement sector contribute 27.5% and 6 .8% of the sample. While some firms selected across 
different sectors, which are 48.2% of the selected sample. The data for this study covered the 
time period from 2004-2009. Table 4.2 presents the descriptive measure of the variable for 
yearly. 
Table 4.2 Descriptive statistics of variables from 2004-2009 
 
FO DIV LEV Growth SIZE NE 
 
Mean STD Mean STD Mean STD Mean STD Mean STD Mean STD 
2004 57.16 16.08 146.50 451.94 4.69 1.82 3.10 26.29 81.17 1.50 77.68 16.47 
2005 56.44 16.38 148.85 500.04 4.80 1.25 34.24 74.10 81.30 1.56 77.52 11.81 
2006 56.83 16.50 166.80 628.99 5.02 1.22 8.66 27.24 81.43 1.50 81.51 10.81 
2007 56.91 16.46 317.53 976.88 4.92 1.05 31.61 40.75 81.64 1.50 81.31 20.71 
2008 56.86 16.10 351.18 1044.11 4.89 1.07 8.84 40.24 81.87 1.56 81.73 19.75 
2009 57.74 17.74 226.17 702.05 4.81 0.99 23.42 44.63 81.99 1.50 80.06 12.52 
 
The mean value of family ownership 57.16 percent (take the percentage share capture by family 
members) is presents that the ownership remains constant over the period. These supports that in 
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Pakistan major are family oriented and encourage holding maxim share with them. The standard 
deviation value is 16.46 recommend the maximum and minimum fluctuation in the mean value.  
Table 4.3 Descriptive statistics of performance variables from 2004-2009 
  ROE ROA Q 
  Mean STD Mean STD Mean STD 
2004 83.46 25.81 6.41 13.06 0.63 0.20 
2005 83.29 41.89 7.04 14.20 0.65 0.23 
2006 88.72 30.55 6.73 11.53 0.61 0.17 
2007 96.73 22.94 9.42 12.00 0.60 0.17 
2008 97.91 23.94 10.11 12.94 0.59 0.20 
2009 97.87 24.01 9.48 11.85 0.59 0.18 
 
The above presents the summary statics of the measures of performance used in the study. The 
performance has explained by the three variables: Return on Asset, Return on equity and Tobin‟s 
ratio. The average value of the ROA is 6.4% to 9.4%.  The deviation in the mean value is 0.63% 
and 0.59% respectively throughout study year. The return on equity has average value 25.81% in 
2004 and 25.58% respectively.  Similarly the return on equity has average value 97.87 % in 2009 
and the SD 24.01%. This shows that firms in the sample efficiently utilize their equity. Table 4.4 
provide summary statistics of the Total assets, Debt-to-equity ratio (Leverage) sales growth and 
percentage shareholding of family sampled firms for the period 2004 to 2009. 
Table 4.4 Descriptive statistics of the variables in a pooled sample 
 
FO DIV LEV G NE SIZE ROA ROE Q 
Mean 78.50 56.99 226.17 4.86 18.94 5.88 7.53 17.67 8.20 
Median 78.50 52.23 1.95 4.94 13.15 6.95 7.58 14.30 6.15 
Maximum 156.00 97.10 4934.70 11.72 294.30 37.10 10.35 96.15 38.30 
Minimum 1.00 29.54 0.00 1.65 -90.20 -81.50 4.51 -163.0 -27.9 
Std. Dev. 45.18 16.29 743.65 1.25 46.24 15.68 1.52 29.25 12.51 
Skewness 0.00 0.64 4.66 0.64 1.99 -1.95 0.09 -1.45 0.28 
Jarque-Bera 9.36 14.11 3798.28 198.85 635.95 484.78 6.42 552.72 2.12 
Probability 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.35 
Observations 156.0 156.0 156.0 156.0 156.0 156.0 156.0 156.0 156.0 
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The results reported in Table 4.4 show the mean value of the percentage family ownership is 
78.50% and median is also 78.50%. These closely related which each other and confirm that data 
of this variable is normal, and the standard deviation is 45.18 % show minimum deviation in the 
mean value.  
The average value of the ROA is 7.53% and the media value is 7.58 %. This is closely related to 
the average value of the ROA and concluded that large number of the firm in our sample has 
10.35% on the return asset.  
The return on equity has average value 17.67% and the median 14.30% these values are also 
closely related to each other. Similarly Tobin‟s Q has mean value 8.20% and the median 6.15%. 
4.2 Correlation Analysis 
The correlation matrix defines the relationship between the explanatory variables and also with 
the dependent variable. It also used as a tool to identified multicolinarity between the 
explanatory variables.  The matrix indicated positive relationship between the family ownership 
variable and the three performance variable. The correlation value is 0.12, 0.24 and 0.15 with 
ROA, ROE and Q respectively. The relationship is week positive 
Table 4.5 Correlation Matrixes 
 
FO DIV LEV G NE SIZE ROA ROE Q 
FO 1 
        DIV 0.024 1 
       LEV 0.09 0.00 1 
      G 0.01 0.10 -0.03 1 
     NE 0.09 0.18 -0.06 0.05 1 
    SIZE 0.10 -0.12 0.07 0.11 -0.06 1 
   ROA 0.12 0.11 0.42 0.22 -0.02 0.00 1 
  ROE 0.24 -0.08 0.20 -0.06 0.09 0.21 0.12 1 
 Q 0.15 -0.07 0.06 0.04 0.11 0.17 0.06 0.31 1 
The matrix also document positive relationship between the family ownership and the size of the 
firm, indicated the family owned are more interested in the expansion rather to distribute the 
corporate earnings. There is a positive relation between the dividend and family ownership, but 
this relationship is vary week, having no major influence.   
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4.3 Regression Results 
 This study has three dependent variables ROA, ROE and Tobin‟s respectively and the 
independent variable is Family ownership (FO). The performance variables are regressed on the 
FO and other explanatory variables Dividend (DIV) leverage (LEV), Growth (G) and Net 
income (NE). The combined results of the regressions are reported in the table 4.6 
In model 1 when regress the dependent ROA on the FO with the other control variables, reported 
positive coefficient of 5.30. It can concluded the family control have high rate of return on their 
investment. But this is significant at the 10% significance level. All the explanatory variables 
show positive association with the ROA. The Growth variable indicate positive and high 
statistically significant with the ROA. The R
2
 is 0.24; its mean the dependent variable is explain 
24% by the explanatory variables. 
There is positive and highly significant relationship between ROE and the FO reported by the 
model 2 of this study. The coefficient value is 1.52 and T-statistics value is 2.50.The analysis 
also report negative relation between the ROE and the Dividend, have coefficient is -0.12 (t-
value -0.192). This relationship is weak and statistically insignificant 
Table 4.6  impact of Family ownership on the performance variables 
 
Variable Model 1 
ROA 
 
Model 2 
ROE 
Model 3 
Q 
 
C 5.30* 
(9.06) 
18.4*** 
(1.52) 
(5.94)*** 
(1.10) 
 
FO 0.0031*** 
(1.29) 
0.125* 
(2.50) 
0.032*** 
(1.46) 
 
DIV 0.0082*** 
(1.20) 
-0.12 
(-0.91) 
-0.05 
(-0.87) 
 
LEV 0.00085 
(5.82)* 
0.006* 
(2.19) 
0.0006 
(0.51) 
 
G 0.28 
(3.23)* 
-1.66 
(-0.91) 
0.27 
(0.34) 
 
NE 0.0011 
(.502) 
0.07*** 
(1.43) 
0.033 
(1.51)*** 
 
SIZE 0.0051 
(0.72) 
(0.33)* 
2.30 
( 0.11)** 
1.84 
 
R2 0.24 0.13                   0.64  
DW 
N 
1.95 
156 
 
1.69                   1.51 
156                  156 
 
Note: The * indicates significant at 1%, ** indicates significant at 5% and *** indicates significant at 10%. The Dependent 
variables are ROA, ROE and Q and the independent variable is family ownership. 
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The overall regression model presents that the ROE is 13 %( R
2 
=0.13) explain by the 
independent variables. The value of Durbin-Watson is 1.69 which is close to the 2 and provided 
that there is no autocorrelation in our data.  
The third model of the study also report positive relation performance variable and ownership 
variable. As the Q is market base value of firm. In the literature its relationship with ownership is 
ambiguous. The literature documented both positive and negative sign for this variable. The 
study also finds negative and statistically insignificant relation between dividend and Tobin‟s. 
The overall regression model indicates that there is (R
2 
=0.64) 64% in dependent variable by the 
explanatory variables. 
5. Conclusion  
This study exam the link between the performances of the firm with the family ownership for the 
period of 2004-2009 of the manufacturing firms listed at KSE 100 index.  The sample of this 
studies 29 manufacturing firms. The study has conducted by focus the Pakistani capital market. 
Where the investors have less protection and the corporate governance is not much mature. 
Beside most of the list firm are family owned firms and the owners of this firms take operation 
according their own philosophy. However this study try find out the   possible effect of the 
performance by the family controls. 
The empirical results show positive effect of family ownership on the firm‟s performance in the 
Pakistani capital market. Where major firm‟s family owned and high management also appointed 
by these owners. These family mangers take decisions for the benefits of the owners instead for 
the shareholder. 
The study also observed positive and significant relation between the family ownership variable 
and size of the firms suggesting that the family control firms prefer to invest in the projects 
rather to distribute earnings among shareholders. This paper also finds negative relation between 
ownership variable and Dividend. Hence it also support that the family control firms have 
conservative approach in dividend payments. The same results was documented by Reeb (2003) 
and Santor (2008) on the US and Canadian economy.  
6. Limitation of the study  
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There are many gaps in this paper for the future researchers. Due to the time constraint 
unavailability of data, the study just conducts on the 29 manufacturing firms. The new much 
increase the sample size and estimation technique and introduced new variables. The most 
important gap in this study not defines the determents family ownership. The coming researches 
can work on this area. The future researcher also includes corporate governance structure in 
Pakistan with family ownership to introduce new dimension in financial decision making.  
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